

# **UNCLE SAM DEPLOYS TO BOSNIA: UNITED STATES NATIONAL SECURITY INTEREST IN BOSNIA**

**A MONOGRAPH  
BY  
Major Curtis A. Lapham  
Armor**



**School of Advanced Military Studies  
United States Army Command and General Staff  
College  
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

**SECOND TERM AY 96-97**

Approved for Public Release Distribution is Unlimited

19971107 015

2  

# REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved  
OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503.

1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)	2. REPORT DATE 7 MAY 97	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED MONOGRAPH	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE <i>Uncle Sam Deploys to Bosnia: U.S. National Security Interests in Bosnia</i>		5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) <i>MAJOR CURT LAPHAM</i>			
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) School of Advanced Military Studies Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027		8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027		10. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES			
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT <b>APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.</b>		12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE	
13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words) SEE ATTACHED			
<i>DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 4</i>			
14. SUBJECT TERMS <i>Bosnia, National Security, Yugoslavia United States Security Strategy</i>		15. NUMBER OF PAGES <i>65</i>	16. PRICE CODE
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT UNCLASSIFIED	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE UNCLASSIFIED	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT UNCLASSIFIED	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UNLIMITED

## ABSTRACT

### UNCLE SAM DEPLOYS TO BOSNIA: UNITED STATES NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS IN BOSNIA

by Major Curt Lapham, USA, 52 pages.

This monograph begins by reviewing the current strategic situation in Bosnia.

President Clinton's security strategy, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* provides the means to analyze how the United States developed its policy to stop the Bosnian Civil War. The fundamental research goal is to determine if it is in the vital security interests of the United States to deploy forces to the former Yugoslavian region of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The study reveals the significant impact Bosnia's past plays while developing America's strategic concepts to establish peace and stability in the region. There is also analysis of the three former warring factions exposing the problems of shared history but an incompatible perception of the past. This author concludes the current deployment of troops to Bosnia is not in our vital interests because America's survival is not at risk. However, there certainly remains interest at risk for the United States that validate the President's decision to commit America's national power to end the war. A lack of American leadership in stopping the Bosnian conflict could ultimately unravel the new American three-fold strategy for Europe.


SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

MONOGRAPH APPROVAL


Major Curt Lapham

Title of Monograph: *Uncle Sam Deploys to Bosnia: United States National Security Interest in Bosnia*


Approved by:

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
LTC Reamer W. Argo, MEd

Monograph Director

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
COL Danny M. Davis, MA, MMAS

Director, School of  
Advanced Military  
Studies

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D.

Director, Graduate  
Degree Program

Accepted this 22d Day of May 1997

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
I. INTRODUCTION .....	1
Significance of the Bosnia Situation	
Secretary of Defense designee William S. Cohen's Concern	
Methodology	
II. BOSNIAN HISTORY .....	5
Pre-World War Two	
Post-World War Two (Yugoslavia)	
Civil War and National Disintegration	
III. UNITED STATES VITAL NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS .....	30
The Elements of National Security Strategy	
The National Security Strategy--Ways & Means	
American National Security Strategy--Bosnia	
United States Security Interests--Bosnia	
IV. ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS.....	44
Bosnian Paradigm	
Possible Outcomes	
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .....	48
The Significance of the Problem, History, and Future	
VI. ENDNOTES .....	53
VII. BIBLIOGRAPHY .....	59

## ILLUSTRATIONS

MAPS	<u>Page</u>
1. Former Yugoslavia, 1997 .....	v
2. Medieval Bosnia .....	26
3. Independent State of Croatia, 1941 .....	27
4. Divided Bosnia—Politically, 1997 .....	28
5. Divided Bosnia—Ethnically, 1997 .....	29

## ABSTRACT

### UNCLE SAM DEPLOYS TO BOSNIA: UNITED STATES NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS IN BOSNIA

by Major Curt Lapham, USA, 52 pages.

This monograph begins by reviewing the current strategic situation in Bosnia. President Clinton's security strategy, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* provides the means to analyze how the United States developed its policy to stop the Bosnian Civil War. The fundamental research goal is to determine if it is in the vital security interests of the United States to deploy forces to the former Yugoslavian region of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The study reveals the significant impact Bosnia's past plays while developing America's strategic concepts to establish peace and stability in the region. There is also analysis of the three former warring factions exposing the problems of shared history but an incompatible perception of the past. This author concludes the current deployment of troops to Bosnia is not in our vital interests because America's survival is not at risk. However, there certainly remains interest at risk for the United States that validate the President's decision to commit America's national power to end the war. A lack of American leadership in stopping the Bosnian conflict could ultimately unravel the new American three-fold strategy for Europe.

## Former Yugoslavia



Figure 1 Former Yugoslavia, 1997

## I -- INTRODUCTION

Ends, ways and means are the heart of a nation's strategic analysis, and two years after the United States deployment into Bosnia began the strategic ends President Clinton seeks are still a matter of debate. Critics have questioned just what are America's vital strategic interests in the region. The President's new Secretary of Defense is among those; he has openly asked "what are our National security interests in Bosnia?"<sup>1</sup>

This monograph looks at President Clinton's national security strategy personified in the 1996 document, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* and Presidential Decision Directive 25, *United States Policy on Operations Other Than War* to analyze United States security interests in Bosnia. The fundamental research goal is to determine if it is in the vital security interests of the United States to deploy forces to the former Yugoslavian region of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

### Road to War in Bosnia

Slavenka Draculic, a Zagreb journalist now turned political leader explains the dilemma Yugoslavia faced with the collapse of the Soviet Union, "This place is not Hungary, Poland, or Romania. Rather, it is the Soviet Union in miniature. . . . This is happening in Croatia, but that is happening in Serbia or Macedonia. Each situation is unique. There are no easy themes here. Because of Tito's break with Stalin, the enemy in Yugoslavia was always within, not without. For years we were fooled by what was only an illusion of freedom . . ."<sup>2</sup> Robert Kaplan in his pivotal book, *Balkan Ghosts* correctly observes that the deep-seated reason for the Bosnian war was Yugoslavia.

Unlike the rest of Eastern Europe, here we see the release of the pressure of discontent horizontally, pitting one ethnic group against another, instead of vertically venting against the central communist authorities in Belgrade.<sup>3</sup> This resulted in a steady breakdown of central authority and ultimately civil war in 1991.

Thus began the long road leading to American involvement in the former Yugoslavia. Reports began to surface, as the war progressed, describing terrible atrocities, labeled by pro-interventionists in the State Department, beginning with George Kenney, as “ethnic cleansing.”<sup>4</sup> This new term was calculated to first remind policy makers and furthermore the American public of the similarities ethnic cleansing had with Nazism of late 30’s. Consequently, it has also served as an indirect reminder of Europe’s failure to stop Hitler fifty years ago; eventually resulting in World War II and American involvement in that war.

America originally preferred to let the Europeans manage the crisis by adopting a strategy of disengagement.<sup>5</sup> Strategic re-engagement began for America when President George Bush took action on 30 May 1992, exercising America’s economic power by adopting a flexible deterrent option. President Bush declared, through Executive Order 12808, a national emergency, citing a direct threat against American national security, policy interests and economy from the actions and policies of Serbia. This allowed the Federal government to freeze all the assets of Serbia. Bush also took additional economic actions 5 June and then 15 January 1993 respectively to place strict economic sanctions prohibiting trade and other transactions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).<sup>6</sup>

This began the long debate among policy makers in the United States roughly divided into two camps. The first school of thought saw the Bosnian conflict as the direct result of ancient ethnic hatreds that no outsider could stop or even broker a peace agreement with the belligerents. Lord Owen, European Union's chief advocate called for "The skill of masterly inactivity seasoned whenever the situation or public opinion demanded, by the judicious application of humanitarian aid or U.N. peacekeepers."<sup>7</sup> This group viewed the Bosnian war as a small forest fire. The best way to control it was isolation; allowing it to simply 'burn out.'

The second school of thought saw the situation in Bosnia as simply unwarranted aggression by the strong, in this case Serbian nationalists, against the weak and unarmed citizens of the new nation of Bosnia. Such men as Serbian President Milosevic and his Bosnian Serb henchmen, Karadzic and General Mladic had masterminded the plan for a greater Serbia and were easily compared to Hitler and his evil Nazi followers. This group was not only motivated by the moral outrage of ethnic cleansing and internment camps. But they also believed if Serbian aggression was not stopped it would spread like cancer, encouraging every would-be aggressor directly leading to an unstable Europe.<sup>8</sup>

President Clinton followed the previous administrations lead by issuing a series of Executive Orders in 1993 and 1994 that continued to tighten the economic noose around Serbia's neck. In the spring of 1994, the Clinton Administration used America's diplomatic power, leveraged by progressively stronger economic deterrence options, to successfully pressure the Bosnian Muslims and Croats. They eventually stopped fighting each other and created a joint federation allied with the Republic of Croatia.

Bosnian-Serb aggression continued, prompting the United States to push for U.N. authorization to use NATO air power in Bosnia to end the bloodshed, forcing the Serbs into peace talks. On 30 August 1995 NATO air power accomplished precisely what policy makers hoped for in launching punitive strikes against Bosnian Serb ADA radar, C<sup>2</sup>, and ammunition storage sites. These actions, combined with a powerful new offensive by Croatian ground forces, brought an end to Serb aggression and served as the catalyst for peace negotiations. The final outcome was the Dayton Peace Accord signed on 21 November 1995 and later finished in Paris on 14 December 1995 in what is known today as the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP).

This led to the commitment of military forces from 25 nations, approximately 60,000 troops from predominantly NATO and U.S. sources in a combined international force--IFOR. Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR began on 20 December 1995 with the beginning deployment of 20,000 American troops as part of Task Force Eagle. This force moved into the Tuzla area to begin establishing a 2 kilometer wide Zone of Separations (ZOS) between the former warring parties.<sup>9</sup>

### **Research Question**

Is United States involvement in Bosnia vital to America's national security?

### **Related Subordinate Questions**

1. What impact will Bosnia's past have on America's vital security interests?
2. Is using American military forces in Bosnia in agreement with the Clinton Administration's Policy?. What could the strategic end state of America's involvement in Bosnia look like?

## **HISTORICAL ANALYSIS**

Many today are skeptical about the usefulness of understanding the past as a way to comprehend the future. However, this author falls into the camp that believes knowing history is essential for understanding a nation's security interests in a given region. Perhaps John Stuart Mill summed it best, "Historical knowledge is at best deeply imperfect and dangerous, and the only solution to this problem is to have more of it."<sup>10</sup>

Studying the historical background of the Balkans in general, and Bosnia-Herzegovina specifically, is essential to understanding the national strategic interests of the United States in the region. The problem with the region, Winston Churchill once said is that it produces more history than it consumes. History clearly reveals that Bosnia, throughout her existence, was cast in the role of 'fault zone' for humanity. Bosnia represents the clash of empires--Rome, Charlemagne, the Ottomans, and the Austro-Hungarians; the religious faiths of Eastern Orthodoxy, Judaism, Islam, and Roman Catholicism. These differences also cut across ethnic, economic and the cultural development in the region. Each of these differences alone has caused wars and strife between different nations and kingdoms from the beginning of human existence.

Bosnia has become a Tectonic fault zone because several of these 'faults' have coexisted causing a dynamic power struggle over this land in a tug-of-war for dominance. In other words, as Kaplan observed, "West against East, the ultimate historical and

cultural conflict.”<sup>11</sup> For example, in the 1914 struggle we find Serbia seeking dominance in the region against the Habsburgs. This develops into a greater friction point, a competition for regional influence between Russia and Austro-Hungarian empires, and ultimately leads to the First World War.

### General

The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Yugoslavia--Land of the Southern-Slavs) consisted of six republics before breaking apart in 1991: Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia. In June, Slovenia became the first of several republics to break away from the weaken central government and seek independence. It was able to do this largely through peaceful means. Croatia followed in July by declaring independence, however Croatian Serbs backed by the Yugoslav National Army (the JNA--under the control of Serbia, the largest republic of the former Yugoslavia) fought a bitter series of battles to prevent formation of a new country. Ultimately, the Croats prevailed with an unconditional cease fire declared in November 1991. The United Nations established the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to stabilize the situation in Croatia and monitor the withdraw of the JNA back to Serbia. Unwisely, the mission was authorized under Chapter VI of the U.N. Charter; this allowed for only peaceful means of accomplishing its mandates.<sup>12</sup>

Bosnia soon followed Slovenia and Croatia’s example and declared her independence in March 1992. Unfortunately, Bosnian-Serbs, a minority ethnic group in the newly formed country, wanted no part of a democratic-pluralistic government ruled by the elected majority--Muslims. They knew, based on previous history, that their

minority status would leave them without a voice in the direction of Bosnia's future and worse yet, dominated by Muslim rule. Civil war soon broke out with the Bosnian Serbs seeking independence and eventual closer ties with Serbia proper.

Bosnia before the war consisted of a mixed population of approximately four million citizens with Muslims, primarily Sunnis making up 44% of the total population. Serbians consisted of 31%, making them the second largest ethnic group; ethnic Croats represented 17%. At the beginning of the war, Bosnian territory consisted of about 51,000 Sq. kms; by the war's end in 1995 Bosnian Muslims and Croats of the Federation retained less than one-third of the original area.<sup>13</sup>

The Muslim, Catholic, and Orthodox groups all descend from basically the same racial stock arriving from the lands north of the Black Sea around the seventh century. Therefore they all speak dialects of the same language, Serbo-Croatian, although the Serbs have adopted the Cyrillic alphabet of their Russian Orthodox brothers. During peaceful times intermarriage and coexistence was the norm, for example in 1991 25% of all marriages in Bosnia were inter-ethnic.<sup>14</sup>

#### **14<sup>th</sup> through 19<sup>th</sup> Century Bosnia**

We will start our look at Bosnia's history beginning with the 14th century, because of Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic's inflammatory speech in 1987 that stirred the hearts of modern Serbs to action against the Muslims. He exploited their resentment of Muslims on both the 598<sup>th</sup> and 600<sup>th</sup> anniversary by recalling the Serb army's brave stance against the Ottoman Turks at Kosovo's *Field of Blackbirds* in 1389.

This is but one of many examples demonstrating the Balkan knack for making battles and ethnic atrocities of the distant past seem as if they occurred yesterday. Croatian leader Franjo Tudjman has often reminded his countrymen and the West of Croatia's position as the "frontline state" of the Catholic West pitted against the murderous Turks and Orthodox expansionist goals.<sup>15</sup> His point of course was true, but you need to go back almost three hundred years to find when it was last valid.

The late 14th century represented another of the great turns in Bosnian history. Ottoman Turkish forces enjoyed considerable success against the Serbs in the 1380's and this encourages a raid into the Kingdom of Bosnia. This force was destroyed by Vlatko Vukovic. The following year, Serbian Prince Lazar felt empowered to seek battle with the Turks to eliminate them from Serbia. His call to neighboring Bosnia resulted in the victorious Vukovic and his Bosnian Knights joining the heavy cavalry of Serbia. In June 1389, Lazar was able to bring his army to battle at Kossovo. Unfortunately the Sultan's light cavalry annihilated the armored knights in a single battle.

Though Serb and Bosnian fought side-by-side modern interpretations of the event are diametrically opposed for the two ethnic groups. The Serb remembers the battle as the start of five centuries of Moslem oppression as they ruled Serb lands. A modern Bosnian Moslem would not dwell on it, but knows that the battle did usher in Ottoman control along with increased prosperity for Bosnia.

The early years of the 15<sup>th</sup> century saw a constant struggle within the kingdom between the King(s), loosely backed by Hungary and the Catholic Church, and various Orthodox Serb noblemen backed by the Turks. This support by the Turks of the defeated

Serbs may seem strange, however Orthodox believers tended to look inside the Empire for religious authority; Catholic believers tended to look outside to Papal authority in Rome.<sup>16</sup> Stephen Vukcic, a non-aligned local leader muddied the situation further by declaring independence in 1448 for the Southern coastal area of Hum. Vukcic's new title as 'Herceg (from Germanic word Herzog -- Duke) of Hum and the Coast' was accompanied by several years of increased power and prosperity in what today has become 'Hercegovina'.<sup>17</sup>

In 1461, Catholic support waned based on Franciscan reports of Bosnian Church's heresy, this included manichaeism and dualism. Meanwhile the Herceg's eldest son rebelled in 1462 and sought help from the Mehmet II for a Turkish assault of the weakened Kingdoms. A large Turkish Army, originally formed at Adrainople, attacked Bosnia on 20 May 1463.

The Bosnian King Tomasevic soon took refuge in his main fortress with his knights. The Sultan promised safety if the King surrendered, so the Bosnian King came out with his comrades. A Serbian-born servant records what happened next: "When the King's servants, who were in the fortress, saw that their lord had been taken, they gave themselves up. The Sultan took possession of the fortress, and ordered that the King and his companions should be beheaded. And he took his entire country into his possession."<sup>18</sup> Except for a war between the Ottoman and Habsburgs over Turk seizure of Bihac in 1592, the Ottoman Empire dominated the area into the 19<sup>th</sup> century.

Noel Malcolm referred to Islamicization of large parts of Bosnia's population over the next three hundred years as "The most distinctive and important feature of

modern Bosnian history.”<sup>19</sup> Certainly he is correct because the dominant religious faith of Bosnia is truly distinct from their Christian Orthodox and Catholic neighbors. Many wild rumors and myths about the conversion of Bosnia to Islam exist. The more popular theories include: A mass settlement of Turkish Muslims; A forced conversion of all Bosnian Christians; A mass voluntary conversion of the Bosnian Church; and finally, Bosnia’s Christian nobility converted to maintain position of power. Each of these reasons has proven false through modern scholarship.

One of the principle reasons for the gradual drift towards Islam was the Turkish system of **devsirme**. Under the Sultan’s manpower recruiting system, Christian boys from the Balkans were gathered and deported to Istanbul. Here they experienced forced conversion to Islam; then followed education and preparation for service as janissary (infantry troops), personal servants, or government positions. Naturally the Bosnians at first resisted but soon began to reap benefits when as early as 1488 the first of 65 Bosnian-born governors controlled Bosnia.<sup>20</sup> Over the years, nine of Bosnia’s children became grand viziers (lord-of-lords), the highest administrative position in the Ottoman system. Nearly 200,000 Bosnian children, many volunteered by their families, would eventually pass through this quasi-citizenship program during the next two hundred years.

Three social factors seem to have influenced many people to convert. First, Islamic law embodied by the traditional discrimination of non-Muslims called *kannun-i raya* placed all Christians as second-class citizens similar to the African-American experience in the post-Civil War South. Second, slavery also played a role as Islamic law

required the freeing of all converts to the teachings of Mohammed. Finally, freed Slavs flocked to the newly established Muslim towns that featured many opportunities for employment and education.

Finally, migration contributed significantly to the increase of Muslims in Bosnia as the power of the Ottomans waned. The largest of these population influxes occurred from 1680 through the 1690s as thousands fled Dalmatia, Croatia, Slavonia and Hungary as the Austrian army advanced. Prince Eugene's huge defeat of the Turks at the battle of Zenta (southern Hungary) not only ended with the raising of Sarajevo on 23 October 1697, but also forcibly displaced approximately 130,000 Muslims into Bosnia. The largest element were Slovenian Muslims, originally derived from Croat Slavs and Bosnian Ottoman leadership. The forced removal and forfeiture of all possessions would in due time plant the seeds of hatred towards Christianity.<sup>21</sup>

Certainly the civil war that tore Bosnia apart in the 1990's related by differing views of the past by Bosnia's 3 principle ethnic groups. Each of these groups has an amazing sense of history and its relevancy to the current injustices they endure. Historical metaphors exist for practically every recent political or social mess. This study uncovered three important themes that develop out of Bosnia's first five hundred years of history.

First, the claims of Serbia or Croatian to parts or all of Bosnia based on historical precedent is not valid. Bosnia, historically outlived both of these kingdoms; however, legitimacy in the West is based mainly on their respective royal houses recognized by the Church and tied to the remainder of Europe by 'blue-blood'. Bosnia with its conversion

to Islam subsequently lost this lineage but gained control of the center of medieval power, Bosnia's urban areas.

The second theme comes from the Turkish practice of placing their Balkan converts into critical administrative positions of every town or village. The effects were far reaching as to this day the majority of ethnic Muslims in Bosnia live in the cities. Conversely, Serb and Croats tend to live in the rural areas and own the majority of Bosnia's land as farmers.<sup>22</sup> The Ottomans, by favoring converts, soon began to both isolate and alienate these groups from their Balkan lineage.

A final theme developed from a decision that created a man-made religious fault zone which split Bosnia. This dates back to Emperor Diocletian's decision in the late third century to split the empire into what later became the Roman Catholic West and a Byzantine Orthodox East.

This has led many to associate the modern Bosnian Muslim as a fallen Catholic or Orthodox Christian needing to be 'brought back to the faith'. Research indicates that in reality a modern Bosnian Muslim most likely came from a collapsing, yet independent Bosnian Church during the 15<sup>th</sup> and 16<sup>th</sup> century.

History reveals that though differences and tensions existed between each ethnic group, there is little evidence to support an internal struggle for control from the 14<sup>th</sup> through 19<sup>th</sup> centuries. In fact, the present borders of Bosnia-Hercegovina have changed little from when the Ottomans established them 300 years ago. The seeds of future conflict may have been sowed back then but the true 'historic' Bosnian conflict grows out of the great wars of the 20<sup>th</sup> century.

### **The Great World Wars and Bosnian History**

As briefly discussed, conflict between the ethnic powers of the region ultimately involves their principle allies who are bound by various treaties to act. Thus, we find in 1914, Germany, France, Russia, and Great Britain involved in a general war, that spreads throughout Europe because of treaty obligations in the Balkans. Religion also represents a point of conflict. It pits the predominate influence of the Catholic Habsburgs against the Czarist Orthodox church, where both struggle to fill the void after the collapse of five centuries of Turk Muslim dominance. Here the Islamic faithful find themselves no longer in the position of privilege but sandwiched in between the power struggle.

The war to end all wars, the First World War, had its origin in the aftermath of the Balkan Wars, 1912 through 1914. European and American authors recognized this as the main cause during the War's first year. Jacob Schurman, author of the 1914 book titled *The Balkan Wars* wrote, "This War of Many Nations had its origin in the Balkan situation. It began on July 28 with the declaration of the Dual Monarchy to the effect that from that moment Austria-Hungary was in a state of war with Serbia {sic}."<sup>23</sup>

Austria presented the fundamental reason for the ultimatum because of Serbian agitation over the Pan-Serb areas of the Austro-Hungarian empire. This not only threatened the very integrity of empire but had already resulted in the assassination of the heir to the Habsburg throne, Archduke Franz Ferdinand at Sarajevo. In reality the Empire was arrogantly flexing her military might during army maneuvers in Bosnia for which the Archduke served as the Inspector General. He chooses 28 June 1914 to visit Sarajevo,

the 525<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo, therefore mocking a sacred national day in Serb minds. As we saw earlier, the *Field of Blackbirds, 1389* came to represent the great Serb stance against their foreign oppressors and a symbol of national courage.

To the radical Serb patriot there was only one foreign power standing in their way to a Greater Serbia and that was the Austro-Hungarian empire. Ferdinand convinced of the moral strength of his position presumptuously insisted on posting the itinerary and route in Sarajevo's newspaper. On 28 June, no less than seven different Mlada Bosna assassins armed with bombs and pistols awaited at independent locations for their opportunity to strike. The first five killers failed, but one, Nedeljko Cabrinovic succeeded in throwing his bomb. It bounced off the Archduke's car exploding on the following car. Yet the Archduke continued on undaunted by the attempt. Unfortunately, his driver soon took a wrong turn and stopped. While backing up to the proper route he stopped right in front of Gavrilo Princip the seventh assassin. Ferdinand's luck and arrogance had ended as Princip unloaded his pistol into the car killing the Archduke and his wife.<sup>24</sup>

Emperor Francis Joseph of Austria determined to crush the Balkan nationalist rebellion that began with Bosnia's liberation in 1908. First, the Croats sought an independent South Slav (Yugoslav) state and then Serbs worked to free Serbians repressed by Austrian rule in Bosnia. To many European leaders Austria's actions seemed those of a tottering giant bent on preserving her image at the cost of bullying a smaller state.

The “Young Bosnian” Serb assassinations of Ferdinand and his wife provided all the momentum necessary. The great European powers entered into war in less than a week. The Austrians determined to prevent the Yugoslavs from looking towards St. Petersburg instead of Vienna. This brought the strained relations of Austria and Russia to a head; setting in motion both the mutual alliance system and decades of meticulous military planning. This virtually guaranteed any local conflict that mobilized one major power would quickly result in a world war. In this case, the war began ultimately over who, Austria or Serbia (Russia’s ersatz) would dominate Bosnia.

Despite what appeared to be overwhelming odds, the Serb Army was able to drive the Austrians from their country in 1914. The war saw ethnically blended forces, Orthodox against Orthodox for example, fighting each other. Among those Muslims and Catholics fighting with the Austro-Hungarians was a young half-Slovenian, half-Croat called Josip Broz -- who later became Tito.<sup>25</sup> During this early success the Serbs first brought forward the idea of a united Southern Slav state. Unfortunately, a new offensive by the Central Powers under the leadership of German General von Mackensen combined with attacks by the Bulgarian Army and an epidemic of typhus caused the Serbian Army to collapse. The army suffered massive losses as it was driven down to the Adriatic coast in full retreat. Only the intervention of the Allies allowed remnants of the Serb Army to escape by ships to an island in the Adriatic Sea.

Bosnian Muslim leaders wasted little time in punishing those Serbs involved in the pre-war independence movement. They arrested approximately 5,500 men and sent them off to prison; most of these prisoners would never return but instead died in the

harsh prison environment. The government did not stop there. They further alienated the Serbs by forcibly moving 5,000 families from East Bosnia to the West side to avoid the possibility of fifth-column actions and evicting an equal number of families to defeated Serbia.<sup>26</sup>

As the war progressed, demands by the Austrians for manpower and supplies harden the hearts of most Bosnians towards them and increased the calls for a united Yugoslav state. Soon the reconstituted Serbian Army along with its allies attacked back into Bosnia with the Austrians conceding defeat in the region at the end of October 1918. Soon after the collapse of Habsburg Empire, jubilant Bosnian-Serbs took out reprisals against the Muslims resulting in 1,000 Muslims men dying, seventy-six women burned to death and 270 villages ransacked.<sup>27</sup>

The First World War resulted in over a 25% loss of Bosnia's pre-war population and over 50% of its pre-war resources.<sup>28</sup> What is more important, it represented another step in the mistrust between the various ethnic groups in Bosnia. Those actions did occur during extreme times of the war and certainly do not represent clear evidence of ancient ethnic-religious hatred of Bosnian Serbs and Muslims. Notwithstanding, several times each side had reached a metaphoric hand out to the other for a united Bosnia and had that hand bitten by the teeth of envy and mistrust. These wounds would take time to heal, but would the balm of peace be applied to Bosnia?

Yugoslavia recognized as a state in 1918 though the kingdoms of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes did not formally coalesce until 1929. The Paris Peace conference of 1919 recognized this reorganization as the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Bosnia, seeking to regain

its identity aligned with Croatia, pursuing a federal confederation empowering each region verse a strong central government, favored by the Serbs. Bosnia's heterogeneous make-up placed her on the sidelines of this bitter power struggle that marked the entire inter-war years. An American visitor to Bosnia at the time remarked, "Here one sees the Bosnian peasant of Orthodox faith drop his contribution into the cup of a blind Mussulman who squats, at the entrance of a mosque. . . . I wonder if tolerance is not one of the greatest of virtues."<sup>29</sup> Noel Malcolm observed that again the threat to this beautiful tolerance came from outside Bosnia's borders.

A great void developed at the end of the First World War in 1918, because four multi-ethnic empires collapsed. Good intentions by the allies at the Versailles conference in 1919 led to the formation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. A constitutional monarchy with a Serb King and representative government established to allow this Southern Slav region to heal from the incredible loss of over 1,900,000 deaths from all causes during the war.<sup>30</sup> Instead, with the opportunity to grab power too great, the chance to heal was lost. Serb control of the government fueled greater resentment and sets the stage for World War Two and the deaths of nearly two million more Slovs.<sup>31</sup>

King Alexander, monarch of the Yugoslavian Kingdom, reacted to the political unrest and political squabbling by imposing strict central control dismissing all democratic liberties and eliminating the long established regional boundaries. This ended nearly 400 years of established Bosnian confines with a move to establish ethnically blended regions, pushing the Bosnians further towards a unified position with the Croats. The King soon surrounded himself with Serb political and military leaders

further establishing a Serbian hegemony. Even with his assassination in 1934 the situation continued to deteriorate.

World War Two came to the fractured Yugoslavia pitting Ustashe (a Croatian independence movement backed by Mussolini), the Chetniks (Serbian Royalists), Muslim divisions of the Nazi Waffen SS, and finally, communist partisans under Josip Tito (a Croat). Early in the war, German and Italian troops stormed through the Balkans in what the Nazi's referred to as *Drang nach Osten* (expansion toward the East) to secure natural resources and protect their southern flank.<sup>32</sup> Hitler established a greater Croat state under the fascist Ustashe party. The following four years saw what is best described as a series of wars piled one on top of the other.<sup>33</sup>

Over 1 in 10 Yugoslavians died in the war with approximately 1 million dying by the hand of a fellow Slav. This loss, combined with losses from the First World War, devastated two entire generations of Bosnians. The region effectively suffered the second highest per capita death rate of all the countries involved in World War Two.<sup>34</sup> It was the Ustase storm troopers whom first began the infamous ‘ethnic cleansing’ operations. They sought to eliminate, through forced conversion, deportation, or execution the ‘lesser’ ethnic groups to include Jews, Muslims, Roma (Gypsies) and of course Serbs. So brutal were their tactics that the German SS officers forced them to stop for fear of wide-spread revolt. It was too late. Serb loyalists and communists struck back as violence spread throughout the nation.

Tito’s communists started out as a small minority aligned with the Soviets. He early on chose to follow a policy that focused on an ideology of a united and equal South

Slav nation were ethnic purges and violent nationalism had no place. This plan brought many followers sickened by the division of the Yugoslav nation. The partisan resistance group grew rapidly as the fortunes of communist USSR began to improve becoming the largest party by the end of the war.

The Second World War ended with Tito seizing power based on the appeal of his message, calling for a united communist Yugoslavia. Naturally, having the mighty Third Ukrainian Army under the capable Marshal Tolbukhin helped Tito consolidate his position by defeating the Serb Cetniks in a bloody civil war. Tito's consolidation continued for the following three years after the war, aided by his secret police the OZNa (Department for the Protection of the People). This 'protection' eventually cost approximately 250,000 more lives in Tito's concentration camps, mass executions, and death marches. His OZNa followed Tito's orders, "To strike terror into the bones of those who do not like this kind of Yugoslavia"--the numbers reveal there were many of them.<sup>35</sup>

### **Bosnian History--The Communist Years**

The new Yugoslavia maintained an independent line from Moscow that began with Tito's split from Stalin in 1948. Tito's decision not to join the Warsaw Pact cemented this course. Yugoslavia even accepted arms shipments of United States excess stockage from World War Two. Some boxes containing 1940s American sub-machine guns were first opened when the fighting began in Bosnia in 1992.<sup>36</sup> Bosnians generally favored the Tito regime because of its fair and equitable dealing with the citizens.

Furthermore, the communists had succeeded in ending the bloodshed and ethnic purges. Yet the ethnic tensions and nationalist passions remained, unresolved from the deep wounds of the last war.

Tito followed a pattern of introducing a series of constitutional changes to deal with this problem by providing for greater local autonomy. Ethnic tension and regional nationalism problems would haunt him until his death in 1980. Critics of Tito quickly pointed out, after his death, that only through a strong central power could ethnic tensions be controlled. Notwithstanding this correct assessment, the ‘genie’ of regional independence was out of the proverbial ‘bottle’ and did not intend to get back in with outstanding debts of blood still owed.

#### **Ethnic Rivalries in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Party Goals—Post Communist Period**

The effect of ethnic identity and its historical basis is critical for American policy makers to understand. George De Vos and Anthony Smith described the power of ethnic identity as “establishing and reinforcing the differences between groups.”<sup>37</sup> Ethnicity is everything in the Balkans, William Johnsen observed “Ethnic identity is *sine qua non* to individuals in the Balkans: many are willing to die or kill to protect it.”<sup>38</sup> So those two important aspects regarding ethnic identity reveal themselves in the region. First, the reality of those different from me cannot belong to the group, leaving little room for compromise. Second, this ethnic lens of the Balkans sees everything as a “zero sum game,” where a gain by one group is always perceived as a loss to the other ethnic

entities. This adversarial relationship eliminates the ability to build a cross-cultural consensus because of the perceived weakness of political or economic compromise.

It is essential to understand each ethnic group's perspective to building a lasting peace in Bosnia. Serbs, Croats, and Muslims all live in this tortured land, where each group, deriving from a common racial stocks. Each identifies with a different religion (Orthodox, Roman Catholic, and Muslim), different language, and culture (Byzantine, Central European, and Ottoman) to comprise diverging ethnic personalities.<sup>39</sup>

### **The Serbs**

This group, throughout history, has practiced an Orthodox Christian faith closely aligned with other Eastern European Orthodox Churches. This includes close ties with their traditional allies in Russia and the Russian Orthodox Church. This ethnic group was first conquered and subjugated by the Ottoman Turks in 1389. The result was Serbs fiercely clinging to their Christian roots as a means of preserving their cultural identity during Muslim rule by way of five centuries of Ottoman dominance. They see this deep religious affiliation as key to their eventual success in driving their Islamic masters from the Balkans. A key practice designed to facilitate Serb dominance in the region is what they call ‘ethnic cleansing,’ the practice of mass expulsion and murder of Muslims in a given area.<sup>40</sup> The Serbs overall goal for the region is establishing the long sought ‘Greater Serbia,’ that includes the territorial linking of Serbia and Croatian Serb areas.<sup>41</sup>

## The Muslims

This group consists mostly of Slavic Serb descendants who found it better to convert to Islam under Ottoman dominance to achieve positions of privilege and eventual power than maintenance of their Christian faith. There exists a close analogy between this ethno/religious situation and the age old conflict of Palestine.

Here the Samaritans (10 Northern Tribes of Israel) sold out to foreign powers and gods, while Judah (2 Southern Tribes--roots of today's Jews) remained faithful. Judah would later endure great persecution, but more importantly saw the eventual restoration, if you will, of a "Greater Israel" in 1948. The Jews of antiquity so despised the Samaritans, considered less than dogs; a good Jew would never consider speaking with one those Samaritans. Thus the power and wisdom revealed through the familiar parable of the paradoxical 'Good Samaritan.'<sup>42</sup>

Therefore the Slavic Muslims, viewed by the other ethnic groups as the 'Samaritans,' those who sold out to the enemy long ago and again in 1941. The Muslims favor an ethnically mixed Bosnia controlled by the majority voted party, which just so happens to be their ethnic group. Bosnian Muslims have enjoyed the position of favor and power for the majority of time. Key to their position of strength has been the ability to seek consensus with their mediocre allies the Bosnian Croats. The Bosnian Muslims goal is the preservation of a united Bosnia-Herzegovina, but this goal has remained frustrated by the Bosnian-Serbs refusal to acquiesce to rule by a Muslim-led government.

## **The Croats**

The Croat people derive from Roman Catholic faith with historical links to Western Europe. They have consistently viewed themselves as the keepers and protectors of the gate to the West. They closely identify with their brief time of power and favor under the hand of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Germans in 1941. The Croats, throughout history have consistently been viewed as fierce warriors, much as the Spartans on antiquity. They were a key military component to the Austrian Empires expansion. They have at times been aligned with the Bosnian-Muslims, for example voting for Bosnia's independence from Yugoslavia in 1992. Unfortunately, for the region, they have proven at times to be less than ideal allies. They have fundamentally similar goals as Serbs by seeking their own ethnically pure regions in Bosnia to link back to Croatia.

## **Fog and Friction**

One of the greatest problems of dividing these groups along apparently clean ethnic lines is the tendency to postulate all developments as deriving from these groups. In fact, there are many Croats and Serbs who believe in Bosnia's future lies in a united federation based on democratic principles and economic ties to the West. Conversely, Muslims have actively supported Bosnian Serbs efforts to stay with a united Yugoslav idea.<sup>43</sup>

One group of Bosnian Muslims in the Northwest, the Moslem Bosnian Organization (MBO), even entered a political and military agreement of cooperation with

the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) in May 1991.<sup>44</sup> Though the MBO did not survive the war it did briefly cause the Bosnian Federation great difficulties.

Interestingly, the MBO leadership based in the northwest Bosnian enclave of Bihac (a declared U.N. safe area in May 1993) came under attack from the Sarajevo government in October 1993. Its autonomous declarations from fellow Muslims would not stand. MBO-type organizations are typical of the often ambiguous nature that often exists and serves as fog to inhibit logical policy development for Bosnia.

The rebel MBO forces, finally driven from Bihac late the following summer, united with Bosnian Serbs and the Krajina Serb Army in Croatia. Based in Croatia, this unusual alliance bedeviled Bosnian Federation forces in the Bihac pocket until the Dayton Peace Accord was signed in late 1995.<sup>45</sup>

### **Historical Conclusions**

John Buchan was correct in his assessment of there being no significant Bosnian history after the Turkish conquest through the beginning of the 20th Century. The historian felt it clear that the inhabitants were either content or unable to project enough power to reveal their discontentment. Speculation would seem to indicate the former applicable to the Moslems, and the latter to the Christians.<sup>46</sup> Perhaps the only exception to his point came out of the Congress of Berlin in 1878. This settlement, designed to foster stability in the Balkans, permitted the Austrians to militarily occupy both Bosnia and Hercegovina but left both provinces as Turkish territory. This was clearly not one of mankind's best examples of stability operations. The Austrian Foreign Minister,

remarked to the Emperor on his arrival from Berlin, “Your Majesty, the Gate of the Balkans (Bosnia) is now open to you.”<sup>47</sup> So the road was open, but it would become a dead-end street for Austria with millions dying for vain conquest during World War One.

Yet the area has remained one of the main tragic areas of mankind’s 20th Century history. William Johnsen’s paraphrase, *What these nations are now depends on where they were when*, relates well to the value of studying Bosnia’s past for its value in understanding the recent civil war. A clear demonstration of the relative value of history to the rank-and-file Bosniac is revealed by Anna Husarska recent conversation with a group of local Serb men:

“What happened here yesterday?” You ask the “cleansers” who took over the ruins. “Well, in 1389 . . .,” explains a Serb irregular fighter while waving a gun. “No, not in 1389: yesterday,” you interrupt . . . “Under the Ottoman Empire . . . “he tries again. “No, please! What happened yesterday?” You get impatient. “Because in 1921, they . . .” You cannot give up, of course, so you sigh and try again, until you get his version of the events.<sup>48</sup>





Figure 1<sup>49</sup>



Figure 2<sup>50</sup>

## THE CORRIDORS OF PEACE






Figure 3. Divided Bosnia – Politically 1996<sup>51</sup>



— IEBL  
- - - Cantons Boundaries  
□ actual figures unknown

26.07.96  
OS PLANS - Source: UNHCR / MNDs

## BH OPSTINAS POPULATION 96



Ethnic Division -- Macro Level

## **UNITED STATES VITAL NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS -- BOSNIA**

### **Elements of a National Security Strategy**

To answer the question regarding the United States national security interests in Bosnia it becomes imperative to first define some of the fundamental terms and ideas. This will enable the reader to gain the author's perspective considered in developing a list of observed national interests. A list of core ideas, first put forward during the Reagan Administration, follows, which the author purposed become critical to the identity of any viable nation-state and thus of vital importance to the United States.

#### **National Purpose**

Purpose provides the basic reason why a nation exists. Its expression embodied in a nation's abiding values. The Declaration of Independence is the beginning of national purpose for the United States: "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness." The Nation's purpose further refines itself with the signing of the Constitution in 1781: "We, the People of the United States, in order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the Common Defense, promote the General

Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.”

Generally, most nations assert ‘purpose’ as domestic order, security, and welfare. National purposes ultimately guided the formation of United States foreign and domestic policy. The importance of purpose and values was expressed by President Bush as “what we are as a people, for our values are the link between our past and our future, between our domestic life and our foreign policy, between our power and our purpose.”<sup>53</sup> President Reagan framed it as “The ultimate purpose of our National Security Strategy is to protect and advance those values. But, if they are to serve as the basis of a National Security Strategy, these values must be translated into the more concrete terms of national interests and objectives.”<sup>54</sup>

### **National Interests**

Interests for a nation-state form the base from which to build a rational relationship with other nation-states and for building a national security strategy. Interests communicate to others what is important and presents motivation for wants, needs and concerns. A state’s interests reveal themselves as the ‘why’ of national security strategy. A nation’s interests can develop from varying points to include geography, religion, history, race, ethnicity, ideology, and security issues. Though the list can become quite lengthy four basic interests remain common with most nations.

*Survival and Security* interests, the most import national interests, refer to a national existence protected from targeted violence and negative foreign influence.

*Political and Territorial Integrity* interests, seek the maintenance of a nation's borders and preservation of its ideology; also, freedom from the influence of a stronger external foe in a nation's internal affairs. This independence is a critical interest described in America as the preservation of our way of life based on democratic principles. *Economic Stability*, for a legitimate nation-state at the base-level derive from sustenance, shelter, clothing, and opportunity to work. These higher-level considerations include domestic economic stability and access to global markets. In the United States this process is progressive and protecting of the worldwide free market economy. *World Stability*, for a nation this exists in reliable access to diplomatic and economic opportunity internationally. American 20th century paradigm of international aid and engagement seeks to preserve freedom of communications and stopping regional instability.<sup>55</sup>

### **Objectives**

National objectives evolve from a national purpose and interests. A nation's objectives become the first level of tangible national actions necessary to attain, promote, or protect national interests. These objectives express themselves as 'Ends' or consequences of national security strategy. For example, if American interests in the Pacific include the survival of South Korea, then the objectives may include: combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and improved North-South Korean relations.

## **Policies**

Policy as a term can often has many meanings, but in our nation-state concept it refers to actions or intents to realize specific objectives. A nation's policies represent the 'Ways' of national security strategy. The example of American strategy for the Pacific Theater may adopt a policy goal for comprehensive engagement in the region designed to integrate China into the international community as a responsible member.<sup>56</sup>

## **Commitments and Programs**

This represents a nation's intention or focus, in the application of its national power. Commitments and programs become the implementation of a nation's security policies. They may include treaties, bilateral agreements, legislation or congressional resolutions. Programs become the allocation of a nation's resources, usually tied to a specific period of time, in support of a program or objective. Returning to the Pacific, a congressionally approved sale of F-16's to South Korea in support of the President's policy of defending the southern Korean peninsula serves as an example.

This section has proposed a set of ideas and examples for understanding the formulation and implementation of American national security strategy. The next section will briefly examine the elements of national power and those instruments of power the United States can bring to bear in the Bosnian civil war.

## **National Security Strategy—Ways and Means**

### **National Power**

National power seems to always revolve around the two central themes of influence and control. John Spanier, in *Games Nations Play*, defined power as the “Capacity to influence the behavior of other states in accordance with one’s own objectives.”<sup>57</sup> The underlying axiom is that a nation without power cannot hope to force its will on another nation. Second, a nation’s power or perception of it, exists in both tangible and intangible sources. These sources of power not directly used in a nation’s national strategy but rather facilitate creation and employing instruments of power. There are basically five critical sources of power acknowledged for the United States:

- Population
- National Will
- Economy
- National Direction
- Geography

When looking specifically at American security strategy for Bosnia, national will and direction took center stage for the nation. Ted Davis in *Concepts of National Security and Elements of National Power* defined will as “The sum total of the predisposition of individual citizens to support national policies and programs and, when necessary, to endure sacrifice. National will is a function of culture, history, the governmental system, and societal organizations.”<sup>58</sup> The people represent the nation’s will on critical issues. The Government represents the focus of national direction in the United States. This provides a unity of effort addressing the people’s will by means of

providing meaning, purpose, and sustainment of programs and policies.<sup>59</sup> Both national will and direction became the principle elements of potent and intangible power that ultimately led American armed forces, the military instrument of power, deployment to Bosnia.

### **Instruments of Power--The Ways and Means of National Security Strategy**

These four instruments--Diplomatic, Informational, Military, and Economic (DIME), represent the usable resources of the United States to effect our national security strategy. A nation's true power lies in the strength of these four elements and the will to use them. All four elements have played an important role in securing American security strategy objectives for Bosnia with the diplomatic and economic instruments originally taking the lead.

The **diplomatic** instrument exists in communications and relationships with other nations. Its purpose--protecting and furthering a nation's interests. Diplomatic methodology seeks relevant historical examples, viewed in context, U.S. interests and objectives at issue, and the relative balance of power. The 'tools' or means available to the nation include: negotiations, recognition, treaties, and alliances. The **informational** instrument develops from ideas and information with a medium for expression. It includes the clear expression of a nation's intent and motivation in a situation.

**Military**, represented by a nation's armed forces is usually the most powerful and thus last instrument of power a nation will use. The military component of national power employed with a careful consideration of ends, ways and means. "Ends" are the

focused and clearly defined military objectives. “Ways” involve the consideration of the varied methods for applying military force. Embodied by the various courses of actions to reach a desired end-state. They become military strategic concepts at the NCA-level. “Means” represent the military resources necessary to accomplish the assigned missions.

The conceptual approach of employing military power is the same at all levels of war where military strategy equals military objectives plus strategic concepts and resources.<sup>60</sup> All the great military theorist emphasized the important relationship between war and politics: Liddell Hart emphasized the military objective is only the means to a political end.<sup>61</sup> Carl von Clausewitz in the 19th century stressed that war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument of power.<sup>62</sup>

All nation states consider their own **economic** well-being as a vital interest and key to their survival. A nation will employ this instrument of power to protect its economy, to improve the quality of life for its citizens, to gain economic power, and to influence the relative power of allied and hostile nations. The stronger a nation’s economic power the greater its leverage to influence other nations foreign and domestic policies.

The United States uses the economic instrument of power more frequently than the other DIME elements. The three principle uses: secure access to markets for exports, protection from unfair foreign competition, and finally, to secure stable and viable international finance and trading systems. Michael Brown in his article “*The Economic Dimensions of Strategy*,” found the United States used economic policy means for five purposes. These included enhancing regional stability through free trade, to

achieve leverage over other countries policies, increasing relative power of allies, reducing the capabilities of adversaries, and sending signals for friends and foes.<sup>63</sup>

This discussion of the various aspects of national power and the various components of national strategy development may seem elementary. Yet they become keen insights into how the national command authority derives our strategy and the policies that implement it. In either case, the author has considered each of the elements that form the varies ‘sinews’ from which the ‘muscles’ of national power attach. Effective use and consideration of each point form the bases from which solid national security strategy evolves. Looking at the Clinton administration Bosnia policy should reveal the application of many of these principles. This is especially true if we select the correct evaluation ‘lens’ to examine the base philosophy underwriting the U.S. policy for Bosnia.

### **Instruments of Evaluation--An Audit of National Security Strategy**

Joint Publication 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations* discusses the idea of three evaluative criteria--adequate, feasible, and acceptable. They aid in selecting the correct strategic course of action when contemplating the use of the military instrument of national power. They admittedly become useful terms for not only this component, but also for the other instruments of national power evaluation.

**Adequacy**, is then described as the determination whether the use of a selected instrument of national power achieves the specified strategic objectives. This leads to accomplishing the desired political or national security objective or end-state.

**Feasibility**, based on the precondition of provision of the proper national resources. The selected instruments of national power can achieve the national security objective with a reasonable chance of success. Finally, the author considers **acceptability** ascertaining if the possible course of action is worth the cost in treasure and resources. Is the contemplated action legal and morally correct, and supportable by both the people and the leadership of the selected instrument of power?

Other methods of evaluating the appropriate instrument of power exist. Perhaps the most famous is former Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger's 'doctrine' for applying the military instrument of power to a situation. He basically developed six conditions before authorizing American military intervention:

- Where there United States national interests at risk?
- Is the United States prepared to commit overwhelming military power to the given situation?
- Is there clearly defined and achievable military objectives?
- Does the military force options considered allow for flexible and adaptable responses?
- Is there reasonable assurance of American public support?
- Is there other instruments of national power that could achieve the same results?<sup>64</sup>

President Clinton modified this approach in his first national security strategy to take into account a fundamentally different world and altered American political

environment. Clinton's criteria remained consistent throughout the initial five years of his administration for employment of American forces:

- Have we considered non-military means that offer a reasonable chance of success?
- Is there a clearly defined, achievable mission?
- What is the environment of risk we are entering?
- What is needed to achieve our goals?
- What are the potential costs--human and financial--of the engagement?
- Do we have reasonable assurance of support from the American people and their elected representatives?
- Do we have time lines that will reveal the extent of success or failure, and, in either case, do we have an exit strategy?<sup>65</sup>

#### **American National Security Strategy--Bosnia**

Secretary of Defense William J. Perry summarized for the House Committee on National Security the United States vital political, economic, and security interests in Europe and how the war in Bosnia threatens these interests. He further expanded:

When I say the war threatens our interests, I am not referring to the actual war itself and the direct consequences of the war, as appalling as those are. Many of you will support this commitment in part on the grounds that we have a moral obligation to seize this opportunity to end the killing and the atrocities.

I'm talking instead about the danger of this war expanding to a wider part of Europe. This is not just an academic concern. Only two months ago, I would have given you even odds that the Croat offensive in Bosnia would provoke a renewed, all-out war between Serbia and

Croatia. And all during the last three and a half years, the danger has been palpable that this war would spread south into Kosovo and Macedonia, involving Albania, and perhaps Greece and Turkey. . . . it is that danger of a wider war that is the most significant threat to U.S. interests.<sup>66</sup>

Secretary Perry became the point man early on for the Clinton administration regarding Bosnia. One of his fundamental goals was to put the message out regarding the developing United States security strategy for the war in Bosnia. This became all the clearer when he testified to the Senate Armed Services Committee on June 7, 1995:

Let me begin by outlining the overall U.S. policy on Bosnia. Our policy consists of four elements: first, to not take sides in the war as a combatant. Second, to be fully engaged in the diplomatic effort to reach a negotiated peace settlement which preserves Bosnia as a state within its internationally recognized borders. Third, to keep the war from spreading. Fourth, to mitigate and reduce the impact of the violence on innocent civilians. And as we pursue this policy, we will do so in a way that contributes to unity with our NATO allies.

Our goal is to protect U.S. interests in the region. It is true that we do not have what I call vital national security interests in Bosnia. That is to say, the survival of the United States is not threatened by actions in Bosnia. But we do have a security interest in preventing the violence from spreading and from stimulating a broader European war. We do have a security interest in limiting the violence and the flow of refugees. And we certainly have a humanitarian interest in mitigating the violence. So in my view, walking away is not an option.<sup>67</sup>

Unfortunately the context of the speech did not survive the sound bites of modern television. So the clear goals of the policy did not alleviate the ‘fog’ surrounding the administration's direction regarding Bosnia during the summer of 1995. Certainly at this date the diplomatic element of American national power was at the forefront of American efforts regarding Bosnia. Both the Secretaries of Defense and State made it

clear the vary security and stability of Europe was in the vital national interest for the United States. This is clear when considering our experiences in Europe and the two world wars we participated to secure the freedom of Europeans from tyranny. NATO, in the post-war period, was the primary vehicle that secured one of the longest periods of peace in Europe. They made it clear that the security and stability during the past 50 plus years were directly threatened by the prospect of an expanding war in the Balkans.<sup>68</sup>

President Clinton further matured the nation's goals and policies toward Bosnia on November 27, 1995. He spoke to the nation, announcing the United States military would lead a force of 60,000 soldiers deploying to Bosnia according to the General Framework Agreement of Peace. The President outlined seven themes which became the heart of his national security strategy for Bosnia to "defend our fundamental values as a people and serve our most basic, strategic interests."<sup>69</sup> America's mission as the President outlined it was:

- Stop the killing of innocent civilians, especially children.
- Bring stability to Central Europe.
- Stop the war from spreading to other Balkan countries.
- Preserve Bosnia as a single state.
- Protect human rights, building a peaceful and democratic future.
- Maintain Europe's stability and freedom--vital to our own national security

Stop the flow of refugees.<sup>70</sup>

### **United States Security Interests in Bosnia**

Throughout the monograph thus far a case was constructed both on histories of Bosnia and national strategy development, and on the perceptions of American security interests for Bosnia. The President's security strategy, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, contains the answers to exactly what these interests are for the region. His solutions are not clearly outlined in ‘bulleted’ fashion but instead interwoven throughout, as if the comprehensive solutions needed to resolve the multiple, interwoven sources of the conflict. The Strategy articulates as the general American interests in Europe:

- A stable and secure Europe achieved through military strength and cooperation.
- United States access to open and vibrant European market economies.
- Support the growth of democracy and individual freedoms in Central Europe, the former communist states, and especially Russia.<sup>71</sup>

Additionally the strategy delineates that important American interests as connected to the Balkan crisis outcome. These interests include: U.S. global influence and prestige, U.S. leadership in Europe, and the vary viability and relevancy of NATO. U.S. policy goals tied to these interests for the former Yugoslavia and preserving the peace, clearly explained in five goals:

- Sustaining a political settlement in Bosnia that preserves the country's territorial integrity and provides a viable future for all its peoples.
- Preventing the spread of the conflict into a broader Balkan war that could threaten both allies and the stability of new democratic states in Central and Eastern Europe.
- Stemming the destabilizing flow of refugees from the conflict.
- Halt the slaughter of innocents
- Helping to support NATO's central role in Europe while maintaining our role in shaping Europe's security architecture.<sup>72</sup>

## **ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS**

### **Bosnian Paradigm**

All the elements of American national power need a conscience effort to align or synchronize them at the national command authority level. A positive example followed the signing of the Dayton Peace Accord. President Clinton played a huge economic card by lifting the total embargo against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) for their cooperative involvement in ending the Bosnian war.<sup>73</sup> Much the same as an arrangement coordinates an orchestra's efforts into a powerful and harmonious concert, so must DIME power application follow the 'arrangement' formulated in the national security strategy. Failure to follow the composer's score is painfully obvious. The same applies to the misapplication of national power, but with far greater ramifications and costs. Bosnia provides several opportunities to apply this axiom and for analysis of DIME application faux pas and exactness. The positive effects, covered in great detail earlier, regarding the NCA strategy for Bosnia. A great example of the negative effect transpired in 1994.

Christine Shelly, spokeswoman for the United States State Department in November 1, 1994 demonstrated the risk of perpetuating an ambiguous national policy when she announced "It's hard to imagine the U.S. participating in that kind of an action

against Bosnian government forces when they clearly have been the overwhelming victim in the aggression by the Bosnian Serb forces.”<sup>74</sup>

If the State Department’s stated views persisted the United States would have lost its neutrality by becoming clearly sided with the Bosniac supporters. Furthermore, the 1995 General Framework Agreement for Peace would not have been possible with the loss of IFOR military force’s legitimacy and neutrality in the Bosnian Serb eyes. Fortunately this view did not prevail, it is informative, demonstrating the importance of unity of effort in all aspects of American national strategy of the NSC.<sup>75</sup>

Problems also developed in America’s early policy formulation in Bosnia when the Department of State and prominent Congressmen began calling for the unilateral lifting of the arms embargo against Bosnia’s predominately Muslim Federal government. This move caused not only a potential rift in the NATO alliance but also opposed the policies of our French and British allies. This demonstrates the importance of having a unified American position within the National Security Council (NSC) regarding Bosnia.

This is a critical issue because ensuring coordination of legitimate policy decisions is a key function of the NSC. It is important for the United States to clearly delineate its strategic interests and strategy for meeting its goals in Bosnia. This allows National Command Authority and the government’s executive agents to most effectively apply the appropriate instruments of national power. The results of not presenting a clear picture can allow for the law of unintended consequences to take effect from the application of power or possible targeting by antagonistic foreign powers.

The United Nations and our allies in Europe followed a path that clearly sought to maintain a neutral position in Bosnia. A fundamental goal of this policy was not establishing an aggressor or victim nation/ethnic entity. Notwithstanding this, President Izetbegovic's information warfare against Bosnian Serbs sought, by propaganda, to portray his Bosniac government as victims. He clearly had two goals: first, for the United Nations to conduct military operations for them rather than remain neutral; second, to gain legitimacy and assistance from the United States.

The strategy of the United Nations and the five-nation Contact Group, composed of the U.S., Britain, France, Germany, and Russia, sought to deny the right of self-determination to the Bosnian Serbs and pursued a policy that forbid the seizing of land by either side while maintaining its neutrality. Arguably of greater importance than a future resolution to the Bosnian conflict, is the strategic relationship between the United States and its European allies.<sup>76</sup> This shapes America's options for the region, resulting in strategic planning alternatives seeking an end state based on a peaceful solution in Bosnia.

The United States commitment to resolving the conflict wholly links the two points with the introduction of American ground forces. Many mistakenly postulated United States presence in Bosnia could end based on the calendar--hence the 12 months and out strategy. Instead the United States strategy adapted to the changing strategic conditions even though U.S. national objectives remain unchanged. To unilaterally remove American forces out of Bosnia, short of a peaceful resolution, is not an acceptable course of action regarding our national interests in Europe.

The possible outcomes of such a move could certainly affect practically every aspect of our country's national security strategy and the NATO Alliance. Consequences include: permanent damage to NATO's credibility, surrendering U.S. leadership of the Alliance, loss of European and American public support for NATO, continuation of American disengagement from the continent, and finally, an end to United States forward presence in Europe. Additionally, potential peer or second-tier hostile nation may view this as a sign of American weakness, rising to challenge America in other regions. The result could become a self-centered America that fails to provide positive influence abroad, creating a void that surrenders the initiative to our opponents.<sup>77</sup>

## **CONCLUSION**

### **Problem, History, and the Future**

*All that is required for evil to flourish is that good men do nothing.*

**Edmund Burke**

This study looked at Bosnia, both its past and present situation, and America's involvement relative to our National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement. A historical examination of three periods of Bosnia's history: Pre-World War II, Post-World War II, and Post-Soviet Union and add insights into the current situation. History also reveals why the United States National Command Authority decided to become involved in the quagmire of present-day Bosnia--The region where two world wars and the Cold War began.<sup>78</sup> This monograph supports the commitment of our national treasure, not just dollars, but more importantly America's sons and daughters, to stopping the bloodshed in Bosnia and allowing peace to have a chance.

A recent interview with Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen confirms the relevancy of the primary research question. Cohen revealed his concerns about Bosnia, and the wisdom of sending American troops on what appeared as an unnecessary missions in the December 16, 1996 issue of *Army Times*. According to Cohen, "I have

yet to identify a vital national security interest in Bosnia," he observed as late as June 1996. He was right and that is why we did not go to war against the Bosnian Serbs.

By using the President's most recent National Security Strategy and his Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25 from May 1995 to compare and contrast America's Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic (DIME) efforts in Bosnia to date the relevancy of America's Bosnia policy to United States security interests becomes clear in its significance.

This also of course requires considerations of other elements besides national power sources; a fundamental element for the United States has always been the critical imperative of American moral values. National security strategy then consists of the traditional concepts of American national interests: Securing our territory against hostile attack, maintaining domestic tranquillity and stability, promoting our prosperity, and advancing our values.

The author looked at discovering what the strategic end state, the commander's vision of mission achievement, if you will, may look like for both our nation and the United States military forces deployed to Bosnia. Succinctly, how will America know when it's time to bring the troops home? Four possible U.S. national objectives for our Bosnia mission include:

- Ensuring the conflict does not spread beyond the borders of Bosnia and threaten both allies and emerging democracies in Central and Eastern Europe--conflict isolation.

- Maintaining a strong, united, and relevant North Atlantic Treaty Organization led by the United States of America.
    - Retaining the United States' position that allows America to assist in shaping not only Europe's security architecture but also mutual peace and prosperity.
    - Ensuring the conditions for lasting peace in both the former states of Yugoslavia and throughout the Balkans.
- America's National Command Authority led by President Clinton and backed by Congress took the bold step and risk of deploying American troops as part of a 60,000 NATO force called IFOR to stop the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This action came directly on the heels of a (U.S. brokered) comprehensive peace plan for the region. Known as the Dayton Peace Accord, it took three weeks of intense diplomatic pressure at Dayton, Ohio by the United States on the three presidents of the Balkan states to reach the historic agreement.
- America's strategic interest in the region were carefully weighed by the NCA and presented to both the Congress and the American people to help build a consensus for United States leadership to end the Bosnian crisis. Nevertheless, President Clinton and his administration still failed to convince the majority of either target audience; A Wall Street Journal survey showed 51% of Americans opposed to U.S. involvement in Bosnia. Notwithstanding this, the President knew that caving into domestic pressure and partisan

political wrangling would adversely impact American foreign policy and our national security interests. Specifically, the lack of American leadership in stopping the Bosnian conflict could ultimately unravel the new American tridentate strategy for Europe.

This new strategy to leverage the post-cold war European environment had three important elements each requiring peace to see fruition. These elements include:

- European security through military strength and cooperation.
- European economic integration embodied in the European Union with U.S. active participation.
- Continued growth of democracy and individual freedoms in Russia and the former Central and Eastern Europe communist states.<sup>79</sup>

By scaling back on U.S. commitments to Bosnia short of our strategic objectives we would undermined U.S. leadership in NATO and more importantly demonstrated a lack moral strength to provide the leadership expected of a benevolent superpower.

The military partly describes senior leadership as the ability to have the “Courage to take the right action even when it is not the most popular course of action.” President Clinton and his civilian and military advisors demonstrated this by making the decision to commit U.S. forces and leadership to stopping Bosnian war and giving peace a chance to take hold in Bosnia. Although the long-term results are yet to be revealed, for the near-term the United States has emerged from the Dayton Accords leading the post-cold war world as the ungrudging superpower. European Powers seemed to have

demonstrated once again a diplomatic weakness, one characterized by bickering and inaction to a war on their very door step.<sup>80</sup> The United States demonstrated in no uncertain terms that since the collapse of the Soviet Union it has stepped up to bear the mantle of global leadership. This position is certainly one which should continue to keep America strong and best supports our national strategic security strategy of engagement and enlargement in the world.

## End Notes

<sup>1</sup> Rick Maze, "White House Aides Say Cohen Adds Credibility," *Army Times*, (16 December 1996).

<sup>2</sup> Robert Kaplan, *Balkan Ghosts*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993, 6.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, 7.

<sup>4</sup> Mary Battiata, *War of the Worlds*, Washington Post, 30 June 1996, as downloaded from the Global NewsBank.

<sup>5</sup> F. Stephen Larrabee, *Balkan Security After the Cold War: New Dimensions, New Challenges*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp., 1995, xvii.

<sup>6</sup> White House Press Secretary, *White House Issues Notice of Continuation of Emergency in Yugoslavia*, U.S. Newswire: Scripps Howard News Service, 24 May 1996.

<sup>7</sup> Mary Battiata, *War of the Worlds*, Washington Post, 23 May 1996, as downloaded from the Global NewsBank.

<sup>8</sup> Mary Battiata, 30 June 1996.

<sup>9</sup> Initial Impressions Report, *Operation Joint Endeavor*, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Center for Army Lessons Learned, May 1996, A-1 through A-3.

<sup>10</sup> Fredric Smoler, "History's Largest Lessons," interview with Doctor Donald Kagan in *American Heritage*, (February/March 1997), 59-67.

<sup>11</sup> Kaplan, 7.

<sup>12</sup> United States General Accounting Office, *Peace Operations: Update on the Situation in the Former Yugoslavia*, Briefing Report to the Majority Leader, U.S. Senate, May 1995, 1.

<sup>13</sup> National Simulation Center, *Training Support Package--Bosnia*. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Spectrum, February 1997, 2-A-1.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, 3.

<sup>15</sup> Daniel Plesch, *An Introduction to the Bosnian Conflict*, article from Matthew T Higham, Mercurio, Michael N., and Ghezzi, Steven W. *Bosnia-Herzegovina*. Washington: Access, An International Affairs Information Service, July 1996, 3

<sup>16</sup> Malcolm, Noel, *Bosnia: A Short History*, New York: New York University Press, 1994, 70-71.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid., 22-23.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid., 24.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid., 51.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., 262.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid., 66-85.

<sup>22</sup> Mark A. Seastrom, *What Strategic Considerations Should Affect a Decision By the United States to Intervene with Military Forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina?*. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Master's Thesis, June 1993, 38.

<sup>23</sup> Schurman, Jacob G, *The Balkan Wars*, London: Oxford University Press, 1914, vi.

<sup>24</sup> Malcolm, Noel, *Bosnia: A Short History*, 155-56.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid., 157.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid., 158.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid., 162-163.

<sup>28</sup> Fact Sheet, *Bosnia: Training Support Package*, Fort Leavenworth, KS: United States Army, February 1997.

<sup>29</sup> Malcolm, 168.

<sup>30</sup> Johnsen, William T, *Deciphering the Balkan Enigma: Using History to Inform Policy*, Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA: United States Army War College, March 1993, 21

<sup>31</sup> Daniel Plesch, An Introduction to the Bosnian Conflict, from *Access Issue Packet on Bosnia-Herzegovina*, Washington D.C.: Acess, July, 1996, 3.

<sup>32</sup> Johnsen, 21-25.

<sup>33</sup> Malcolm, 174.

<sup>34</sup> Bosnia Fact Sheet, 2-A-7.

<sup>35</sup> Malcolm, 193.

<sup>36</sup> Plesch, 4.

<sup>37</sup> Johnsen, 8. Johnsen paraphrases De Vos' words; see George De Vos, *Ethnic Pluralism*, in De Vos and Lola Romanucci-Ross, eds., *Ethnic Identity: Cultural Continuities and Change*, Palo Alto: Mayfield Publishing Co., 1976, 16.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid., 1.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid., 8. Johnsen provides an excellent discussion on the importance of the whole ethnic issue to having any hope of developing an effective policy for Bosnia.

<sup>40</sup> Mary Battiata, *War of the Worlds*, Washington Post, 23 May 1996, as downloaded from the Global NewsBank, 2. Kenney first heard this phrase directly from the Serbs in Belgrade and provided senior State Department officials with the term which eventually served to unite United States efforts for action in Bosnia.

<sup>41</sup> CNN Balkan Tragedy Page, *Ethnic Rivalries*, undated copy.

<sup>42</sup> The Bible, *The Good Samaritan*, Gospel of Luke, 10: 30-37.

<sup>43</sup> Seastrom, 38.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid., 49.

<sup>45</sup> United States General Accounting Office, *Peace Operations: Update on the Situation in the Former Yugoslavia*, 24-25.

<sup>46</sup> John Buchan, *Yugoslavia*, Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Company, 1923, 158.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid., 159.

<sup>48</sup> Johnsen, 12.

<sup>49</sup> Malcolm, xiv.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid., xv.

<sup>51</sup> Bosnian map 1, internet source: //geog.gmu.edu/gess/jwc/bosnia

<sup>52</sup> Ibid., 2.

<sup>53</sup> Office of the President of the United States. *A National Security Strategy*. by President George Bush, Washington, D.C.: GPO, August 1991, v.

<sup>54</sup> Office of the President of the United States. *A National Security Strategy*. by President Ronald Reagan. Washington, D.C.: GPO, January 1988, 3.

<sup>55</sup> Ted Davis, *Concepts of International Politics and Sovereign Nation-States*, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, August 1995, 4.

<sup>56</sup> Office of the President of the United States. *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*. by President Bill Clinton, Washington, D.C.: GPO, February 1996, 40.

<sup>57</sup> Source of quote Ted Davis' article *Concepts of National Security and Elements of National Power*, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, August 1995, 42.

<sup>58</sup> Ted Davis, *Concepts of National Security and Elements of National Power*, 43.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid., 44.

<sup>60</sup> Arthur F. Lykke, "Toward an Understanding of Military Strategy," in *Military Strategy: Theory and Application*, Pennsylvania: Carlisle Barracks--United States Army War College, March 1993, 3-4.

<sup>61</sup> B.H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy*, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975, 351.

<sup>62</sup> Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976, 86-87.

<sup>63</sup> Michael L. Brown, "The Economic Dimensions of Strategy," in *Parameters*, Summer 1986, 16, 2, 36-44.

<sup>64</sup> Fareed Zakaria, "A Framework For Intervention," in *U.S. Intervention Policy for the Post Cold War World*, eds. Arnold Kanter and Linton F. Brooks, New York: W.W. Norton, 1994, paraphrased version of Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger, in an address to the National Press Club in Washington, D.C. on November, 28, 1984.

<sup>65</sup> President Bill Clinton, *National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, February 1996, 18-19.

<sup>66</sup> Statement of Secretary of Defense William J. Perry, *On the Deployment of U.S. Troops with the Bosnia Peace Implementation Force*, to the House Committee on International Relations and National Security, November 30, 1995.

<sup>67</sup> Statement of Secretary of Defense William J. Perry, *U.S. Policy on Bosnia Remains Consistent*, to the Senate Armed Services Committee and House Committee on National Security, June 7, 1995.

<sup>68</sup> Statement of Secretary of Defense William J. Perry and General John M. Shalikashvili, USA, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *U.S. Involvement Underwrites Bosnian Peace Bid*, to the Senate Armed Services Committee, October 17-18, 1995.

<sup>69</sup> Statement of the President of the United States Bill Clinton, *America Must Choose Peace*, to the nation, November 27, 1995.

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*, 1-3.

<sup>71</sup> President Bill Clinton, *National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, February 1996, 35-39.

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*, 35. Concepts further developed in W. Johnsen's *Deciphering the Balkan Enigma*, November, 1995.

<sup>73</sup> President Bill Clinton, *Presidential Determination No. 96-7*, December 27, 1995.

<sup>74</sup> John E. Sray, *U.S. Policy and the Bosnian Civil War: A Time for Reevaluation*, 3. Sray provides the quote from DOD News Summary, 1 Nov. 1994. LTC Sray has served as both a UN G-2 planner in Bosnia and as an American intelligence officer with assignment as a Russian FAO. His many small booklets published by FMSO provide insightful reading on the subject of Bosnia and often prophetic in outlining U.S. strategy for Bosnia after the Dayton Accords.

<sup>75</sup> Robert D. Walz, *The United States National Security Organization, Process, and Products*, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Command and General Staff College, August 1995, 2.

<sup>76</sup> John E. Sray, *U.S. Policy and the Bosnian Civil War: A Time for Reevaluation*, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Foreign Military Studies Office, 1995, 1.

<sup>77</sup> William T. Johnsen, *U.S. Participation in IFOR: A Marathon, not a Sprint*, Strategic Studies Institute. Carlisle Barracks, PA: United States Army War College, June 1996, 2.

<sup>78</sup> National Security Strategy, 1996, 38.

<sup>79</sup> Ibid., 35-39. This portion of the NSS contains a very detailed discussion of each of these important elements to U.S. strategy in the region.

<sup>80</sup> World Press Review, *An Uneasy Peace in Bosnia: Dayton Offers Few Answers*, Vol. 43, Issue 2, February 1996, 12-13.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Almond, Mark. *Europe's' Backyard War: The War in the Balkans.* London.: Mandarin Paperbacks, 1994.
- Baumann, Robert F. *Russian-Soviet Unconventional Wars in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Afghanistan.* Washington, D. C.: United States Army Center of Military History, April 1993.
- Bolger, Daniel P. *Savage Peace: Americans at War in the 1990s.* Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1995.
- Clausewitz, Carl Von. *On War.* ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989.
- Cohen Lenard J. *Broken Bonds: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia.* Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1993.
- Dizdarevic, Zlatko. *Sarajevo: A War Journal.* New York: Fromm International, 1993.
- Dragnich, Alex N. *Serbs and Croats: The Struggle in Yugoslavia.* New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Publishers, 1992.
- Eyal, Jonathan. *Europe and Yugoslavia: Lessons from Failure.* London: Royal United Services Institute for Defense Studies, 1993.
- Gaston, James, ed. *Grand Strategy and the Decisionmaking Process.* Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1992.
- Glenny, Misha. *The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War.* New York: Penguin Books, 1992.
- Gutman, Roy. *A Witness to Genocide.* New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1993.

- Hall, Brian. *The Impossible Country: A Journey Through the Last Days of Yugoslavia*. Boston: David R. Godine, Publisher, 1994.
- Harris, Paul. *Somebody Else's War: Frontline Reports from the Balkan Wars*. United Kingdom: Spa Books, 1992.
- Hart, B.H. Liddell. *Strategy*. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975.
- Higham, Matthew T., Mercurio, Michael N., and Ghezzi, Steven W. *Bosnia-Herzegovina*. Washington: Access, An International Affairs Information Service, July 1996.
- Kaplan, Robert D. *Balkan Ghosts*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994.
- Karahasan, Dzevad. *Sarajevo, Exodus of a City*. New York: Kodansha International, 1994.
- Kinder, Hermann and Hilgemann, Werner. *The Anchor Atlas of World History*. Vol I and II. New York: Anchor Books, 1974.
- Larrabee, Stephen F. *Balkan Security After the Cold War*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1995.
- MacKenzie, Lewis. *Peacekeeper: The Road to Sarajevo*. Vancouver: Douglas and McIntyre, 1993.
- Malcolm, Noel. *Bosnia: A Short History*. New York: New York University Press, 1994.
- Ridgeway James and Jasmina Undovicki. *Yugoslavia Ethnic Nightmare: The Inside Story of Europe's Unfolding Ordeal*. New York: Lawrence Hill Books, 1995.
- Rieff, David. *Slaughterhouse: Bosnia and the Failure of the West*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995.
- Schurman, Jacob G. *The Balkan Wars*. London: Oxford University Press, 1914.
- Summers, Harry. *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Gulf War*. New York: Dell Publishing, 1992.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Persian Gulf War Almanac*. New York: Facts on File, 1995.

Szayna, Thomas S. *Ethnic Conflict in Central Europe and the Balkans: A Framework and U.S. Policy Options*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1994.

Thompson, Mark. *A Paper House: The Ending of Yugoslavia*. New York: Pantheon Books, 1992.

Vulliamy, Ed. *Seasons in Hell: Understanding Bosnia's War*. New York: St. Martin Press, 1994.

Woodward, Susan. *Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War*. Washington, D. C.: The Bookings Institute, 1995.

#### News Papers, Periodicals and Articles

Battiata, Mary. *War of the Worlds*. *Washington Post*, 30 June 1996.

Brown, Michael L. "The Economic Dimensions of Strategy." In *Parameters*, Summer 1986, 16, 2, 36-44.

Leach, James. "A Republican Looks at Foreign Policy. *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1992, 17-31.

Lykke, Arthur F. "Toward an Understanding of Military Strategy," in *Military Strategy: Theory and Application*, Pennsylvania: Carliel Barracks--United States Army War College, March 1993, 3-4.

Maze, Rick. "White House Aides Say Cohen Adds Credibility." *Army Times*, ( 16 December 1996).

Smoler, Fredric. "History's Largest Lessons". Interview with Donald Kagan. *American Heritage*, February/March 1997 , 59-67.

White House Press Secretary. *White House Issues Notice of Continuation of Emergency in Yugoslavia*. U.S. News wire: Scripps Howard News Service, 24 May 1996.

Zakaria, Fareed. "A Framework For Intervention." In *U.S. Intervention Policy for the Post Cold War World*. eds. Arnold Kanter and Linton F. Brooks. New York: W.W. Norton, 1994.

#### Government Documents and Manuals

Initial Impressions Report. *Operation Joint Endeavor*. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Center for Army Lessons Learned, May 1996.

National Simulation Center. *Training Support Package--Bosnia*. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Spectrum, February 1997.

Office of the President of the United States. *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*. by President Bill Clinton. Washington, D.C.: GPO, February 1996.

Office of the President of the United States. *A National Security Strategy*. by President George Bush, Washington, D.C.: GPO, August 1991.

Office of the President of the United States. *A National Security Strategy*. by President Ronald Reagan. Washington, D.C.: GPO, January 1988.

Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies. *Europe and Yugoslavia: Lessons From a Failure*. By Jonathan Eyal. Great Britain: Whitehall, London, 1993.

United Nations Department of Public Information. *The United Nations and the Situation in the Former Yugoslavia*. May, 1993.

United States General Accounting Office. *Peace Operations: Update on the Situation in the Former Yugoslavia*. Briefing Report to the Majority Leader, U.S. Senate. May, 1995.

#### Published Papers

Blank, Stephen J., Johnsen, William T., and Tilford, Earl H. *U.S. Policy in the Balkans: A Hobson's Choice*. Strategic Studies Institute. Carlisle Barracks, PA: United States Army War College, August 1995.

Davis, Ted. *Concepts of International Politics and Sovereign Nation-States*. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (DJCO), August 1995.

Johnsen, William T. *Insights Into the Balkan Enigma*. Strategic Studies Institute. Carlisle Barracks, PA: United States Army War College, January 1993.

Johnsen, William T. *Deciphering the Balkan Enigma: Using History to Inform Policy*. Strategic Studies Institute. Carlisle Barracks, PA: United States Army War College, March 1993.

Johnsen, William T. *U.S. Participation in IFOR: A Marathon, Not a Sprint*. Strategic Studies Institute. Carlisle Barracks, PA: United States Army War College, June 1996.

Seastrom, Mark A. *What Strategic Considerations Should Affect a Decision By the United States to Intervene with Military Forces in Bosnia-Hercegovina?*. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Master's Thesis, 1993.

Stray, John E. *U.S. Policy and the Bosnian Civil War: A Time for Reevaluation*. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Foreign Military Studies Office, 1995.

Walz, Robert D. *The United States National Security Organization, Process, and Products*. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Command and General Staff College (DJCO), August 1995.

#### Other

Clinton, William J., President, *Statement by the President of the United States on Bosnia*. The Oval Office of the White House. 27 November, 1995.

Perry, William J., Statement of Secretary of Defense, *U.S. Policy on Bosnia Remains Consistent*. To the Senate Armed Services Committee and to the House Committee on National Security. June 7, 1995.

Perry, William J., Statement of Secretary of Defense, *On the Deployment of U.S. Troops with the Bosnia Peace Implementation Force*. To the House Committee on International Relations and National Security. November 30, 1995.

Perry, William J., Statement of Secretary of Defense and General John M. Shalikashvili, USA, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *U.S. Involvement Underwrites Bosnia Peace Bid*. To the Senate Armed Services Committee. October 17-18, 1995.

Perry, William J., Secretary of Defense. *Speech to the Center for Strategic and International Studies*. Washington, D.C. December 7, 1995.

Petrov, Boris. *Details of Dayton Agreement*, 21 November, 1995.

## Internet

Bosnia Homepage. <http://www.cco.caltech.edu/~bosnia/bosnia.html> *History of the War, Maps, and Latest Developments.* 1995-1997.

Bosnia Peace Agreement. <http://www.access-dayton.com/> *Full Text of the Dayton Agreement and Related Information.* 1995-1996.

CNN Interactive, The Balkan Tragedy Page. <http://www.cnn.com/> *The Balkan Players: Who are they and what do they want?.* Posted 22 November 1995.

IFOR Coalition Press Information Center. *IFOR Fact Sheet.* Sarajevo, 1996.

Maps. <http://acs.supernet.net:80/maps/> *Maps of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.* 1997.

Periscope Special Report. *Operation Joint Endeavor and the Implementation Force (IFOR),* 1995.

United States Department of Defense Bosnia-Link.  
<http://www.dtic.dla.mil/bosnia/index.html> *Facts Sheets, Presidential, and Secretary-level Policy Speeches.* December 1995 - November 1996.

United States Department of State. <http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/boshome.html> *Bosnia State Department Issues.* December 1995 - November 1996.